We use the 2012 South Carolina Department of Revenue data breach as a natural experiment to study how data breaches and news coverage about them affect consumers' take-up of fraud protections. We find that consumers directly affected by the breach acquired fraud protections immediately after the breach. The response of consumers exposed to the news about the breach only, was negligible. Among consumers directly affected by the data breach, the incremental effect of news was small. We conclude that in the absence of their direct exposure, consumers did not revise their beliefs about future expected losses associated with data breaches.
Introduction
In 2013-2014, a number of high-profile data breaches hit U.S. companies, including bigbox retailers Target and Home Depot and a major U.S. bank, JPMorgan Chase. In these three incidents, 312 million consumer records were compromised. The stolen information included names, addresses, and e-mail addresses at JPMorgan Chase and individual credit and debit card numbers at Target and Home Depot.
1 As one expert said, "It'd be hard to find anybody in the US who hasn't had a credit card affected." 2 Despite the millions of consumers affected by data breaches, little is known about how these actors react to such events. This study is one of the first in the literature to examine this question using a new and unique data set of data breach victims.
For identification we use a particular information security incident: the 2012 South Carolina Department of Revenue data breach. This data breach provides a unique natural experiment that allows us to identify precisely a group of consumers who were directly exposed to risks created by the breach. We can compare the reactions of those consumers with others who
were not directly affected but who were exposed to essentially the same news about the breach.
For the latter group, there might have been an indirect effect of the breach: Those consumers might have updated their beliefs about expected losses from future data breaches.
To be more explicit, this incident compromised the records of most South Carolina residents (at least 81 percent), but very few records were stolen from residents of other states.
This feature is the basis of our identification strategy. The South Carolina data breach is a "treatment" that directly affected South Carolina residents at the time of the breach (October 2012) and indirectly affected residents of neighboring Georgia and North Carolina (consumers in shared media markets) through the news. 3 We use an events study methodology to estimate the effect of the breach itself and information about the breach on consumer responses.
Previous research on the effect of identity theft on consumers mostly focuses on the adoption and use of various payment options, such as debit or credit cards and online bill pay (Kahn and Liñares-Zegarra, 2015) . Stavins (2013) argues that the adoption of less-established payment methods may be affected by their perceived security, and security may influence the use of more established payments. Cheney et al. (2012) suggest that data breaches may pose risks for the U.S. payment card systems. In addition, Kosse (2013) argues that news on debit card fraud decreases consumer usage of debit cards for only about one day.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first in the literature to estimate some specific causal effects of data breaches on consumers. We also look beyond the consumer's payment choice and into other ways the consumer may react to data breaches and identity theft, such as protecting her credit file by purchasing insurance and credit monitoring services. This additional monitoring of credit files and attention to credit may benefit both consumers and lenders (see Cheney et al., 2014; and Mikhed, 2015) .
This study contributes to the growing literature which examines consumer reaction to crime and natural disasters. One important finding in this literature is that economic agents overreact to a rare event (e.g. a flood or a data breach) after it occurs. This overreaction may not be consistent with rational behavior and may be explained by a behavioral heuristic called availability bias (Kahneman, 2011) or a learning process such as Bayesian learning (Gallagher, 2014; Davis, 2004) . 4 However, unlike these previous studies of rare events, we find evidence inconsistent with economic agents overreacting to rare events or learning about them from easily accessible information. We find that only consumers directly exposed to the data breach took action to protect themselves from additional fraud damage. Consumers only subject to the news about the breach did not update their beliefs about future unrelated data breaches and did not act on these updated beliefs to acquire additional fraud protections.
We hypothesize that the South Carolina data breach can affect consumers' perception about the safety of their personal information via three separate channels. First, this event can have a direct effect on victims. The data breach notification letter sent by the South Carolina government emphasized that breach victims were at risk of further identity theft and damage from criminal use of the stolen data. 5 Second, consumers who became aware of the South Carolina data breach via news coverage in shared media markets may update their beliefs about their exposure to losses from future, unrelated data breaches. This reaction would be consistent with Bayesian learning (Gallagher, 2014) or availability bias (Kahneman, 2011) . Third, local news coverage of the South Carolina data breach and generic identity theft may trigger additional consumer responses if it generates a panic. Kahneman (2011) and Kuran and Sunstein (1999) suggest that extensive media coverage may generate an "availability cascade," in which an event may trigger a self-reinforcing media cycle. In our example, an availability cascade would ensue 4 Availability bias is a mental heuristic that assigns more weight to recent, easily recalled memories when making decisions (Kahneman, 2011) . Bayesian learning is a learning process in which events that are more recent are weighted more heavily than events in the distant past (Gallagher, 2014) .
5 Data breaches with more informal notifications or notifications coming from less trustworthy sources may be less effective in warning consumers about the danger of additional criminal activity.
if local news about a data breach propagates widespread public fear about identity theft. We refer to these latter two channels as indirect effects. We compare the reactions of consumers in several "treatment" and "control" groups to measure the relative importance of these three channels.
Mostly South Carolina residents were directly affected by the breach, and their exposure was clearly communicated to them by the South Carolina government. The response of residents in Georgia and North Carolina must come through the second and third channels described previously. In contrast, South Carolina residents may be reacting to all three channels. This permits us to distinguish between the direct and indirect effects defined previously. In other words, by comparing the reaction of South Carolina residents to this specific breach with the reaction of Georgia and North Carolina residents, we can separate the effect of consumers taking precautions in response to their actual exposure to this event from the response of consumers updating their beliefs about future risks. In addition, we can measure the exposure to news about the South Carolina data breach among residents of South Carolina and the other two states. By doing so, we can determine if greater exposure to news increases the response among data breach victims and their geographic neighbors.
To gauge the effect of the breach on consumers' behavior, we examine the adoption of five fraud protection services: initial fraud alerts, extended fraud alerts, credit watches, credit (security) freezes, and credit opt outs. All these services provide consumers with one or more of the following features: additional identity verification from lenders, fraud insurance coverage, a complete credit file freeze, and removal from prescreened credit or insurance solicitations. We find that victims of the 2012 South Carolina Department of Revenue Breach acquired much more fraud protection services immediately after the breach relative to consumers in other states.
Consumers affected by the breach were six times more likely to put an initial fraud alert in their credit files compared with unaffected individuals. In addition, the odds of data breach victims obtaining a credit watch were 55 times higher than that of the control groups. Data breach victims were 29 times more likely to freeze their credit files and three times more likely to opt out of credit offers. Consumers directly exposed by the data breach incurred nonpecuniary (and possibly pecuniary) costs to obtain additional protection from possible identity theft. Before the event, the vast majority of South Carolina residents were not using those protections, an observation that suggests there was a significant change in their expectations in light of this specific data breach.
We use the local television markets as defined by Nielsen's Designated Market Areas (DMAs) to examine the reaction to the breach of North Carolina and Georgia residents who received television news coverage about the breach identical to that received by residents of South Carolina but who were not members of the breached set of consumers. Consumers in neighboring states might have used information about the breach in South Carolina to update their beliefs about the likelihood of future, unrelated data breaches. We find little evidence that consumers in those states revised their beliefs; there was practically no increase in enrollment in various forms of protection.
6
Finally, we measure the effects of the amount of news coverage about the data breach on consumers' take-up of fraud protection services. 7 We construct a local news index on data security, fraud, and identity theft using the LexisNexis news database. We find that the breach 6 It is possible that the certainty of which consumers were directly affected by the breach contributed to this result.
In other breaches in which the extent of the exposed population is less clear, the reaction to news about the breach might be different. generated a large increase in the amount of news about fraud and identity theft, disproportionately so for newspapers headquartered in South Carolina. Local newspaper coverage of this topic seemed to increase slightly the take-up of fraud protection in South
Carolina as well as in North Carolina and Georgia. However, the effect of increased news coverage is much smaller than the effect of being a South Carolina resident at the time of the breach. In addition, it does not appear that newspaper reporting significantly amplified the effect of the breach on the take-up of fraud protection within South Carolina at the time of the breach.
From our results, we conclude that news coverage informed the decision to insure against future breach events for some consumers. The majority of consumers, however, only seriously considered fraud protection services after they formed a strong belief that their personal information was compromised. That belief was almost certainly created by the written and other communications of the South Carolina government. 
South Carolina Department of Revenue Data Breach
On October 26, 2012, the South Carolina Department of Revenue (henceforth referred to as the SCDOR) announced it had experienced a data breach that exposed 3.6 million Social Security numbers (SSNs) and 387,000 credit and debit card numbers of South Carolina taxpayers. 9 The information on 3.3 million bank accounts was also stolen. 
Data

Fraud Protection Services
The primary data set used in this paper is the Federal This data set covers Q1:2010 through Q3:2013.
Credit bureaus place initial fraud alerts on consumers' files free of charge for consumers who assert "in good faith a suspicion that the consumer has or is about to become a victim of fraud or related crime, including identity theft." 20 These alerts last 90 days, and consumers can renew them repeatedly. Extended fraud alerts are also free of charge but require the consumer to file a police report before placing the alert in a credit bureau file. These alerts last up to seven years and include a five-year period of exclusion from prescreened credit card and insurance solicitations. Lenders must take additional steps to verify an applicant's identity when granting credit to anyone whose credit report has an active initial or extended alert.
Credit freezes are a fee-based service unless state law requires them to be provided for free. The existence and size of a fee to initiate and disable the credit freeze temporarily or permanently also varies by state. Credit freezes differ from initial and extended alerts in that a credit freeze completely blocks access to the flagged credit bureau record until the freeze is lifted. Credit freezes are free in South Carolina and North Carolina, while in Georgia there is a $3 fee to file, temporarily lift, or permanently lift the freeze.
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Credit watches, such as Experian's ProtectMyID Alert, are commercial services offered by credit bureaus and security companies to monitor a consumer's credit bureau file for fraud activity. In our data set, we have information on credit watch services offered by Equifax and 12 those from other companies that are recorded at the three major credit bureaus. Although the monthly fee varies among service providers, all credit watch services have similar features.
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First, they notify consumers of any changes in the monitored credit bureau files. Second, they provide unlimited access to credit reports and identity theft insurance. In addition, credit watches allow filers to contact an identity theft specialist with fraud-related questions. Finally, credit watches offered by Equifax offer the option to request that Equifax files initial alerts every 90 days on the consumer's behalf. 23 As mentioned in Section 2, the SCDOR made ProtectMyID
Alert and CSID credit watches available to affected consumers for free.
Consumers who do not want to receive prescreened offers of credit or insurance can voluntarily activate opt-out for such offers. After a period of five years, the consumer may choose to renew the opt-out for another five-year period.
The different types of fraud protection services considered in this paper vary in their costs and credit implications for the consumer. 24 Initial alerts and extended alerts are the cheapest options and do little to hinder future access to credit. Opt-outs are also free, but they may prevent the consumer from receiving attractive credit and insurance offers through the mail. Both credit watches and credit freezes may have fees, but victims of a data breach may obtain these services at no cost, at least for a period of time. All else equal, credit watches are not as restrictive as credit freezes, which completely prevent credit inquiries. In the subsequent analysis, we will use such stratification in the direct and indirect costs of the five fraud protection services as a proxy for the "seriousness" of consumer expected loss from the SCDOR data breach.
News Index
We created an index that measures the intensity of news coverage about data breach and fraud events using the Nexis news database provided by LexisNexis. The Nexis news database is a collection of newspaper articles, trade press, magazines, newswires, and television transcripts from 26,000 sources around the world.
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To create the news index, we constructed a Boolean search focused on finding news articles about identity theft and data breaches between 01/01/2010 and 09/30/2013 from local newspapers in South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia. Our search criteria identified articles with variations of the terms "identity theft" and "data breaches" as well as articles more broadly about financial or data crimes. Additional search terms included variations of the following terms: data security, system security, network security, hack, data compromise, tokenization, data intrusion, system intrusion, network intrusion, and stolen data. These search terms were further filtered to apply only to articles tagged with cybercrime, fraud and financial crime, and identity theft index terms in the Nexis system. More general articles about information crime were included with the expectation that the content of such articles raises similar concern about the safety of consumers' financial information as does the content in articles about identity theft and data breaches. We restrict the search to local newspapers only because information from national newspapers is distributed across all regions, and geographic variation in news coverage is needed to measure the effect of news exposure on the propagation of fraud alert filings.
The search is designed explicitly to manage the tradeoff between identifying the most articles possible while filtering out articles that are irrelevant to the subject matter of interest.
Although it is possible that a few extraneous articles slipped through our criteria, a visual examination of the search results shows that the search is as accurate and comprehensive as we intended.
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Our search returned 7,166 unique articles about identity theft and data breaches from 155 local sources in 124 cities, towns, and other locations across the three states during 01/01/2010 to 09/30/2013. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the names of the searched newspapers and their associated cities and towns of coverage. We identify the city or town associated with a particular newspaper by the newspaper description presented by LexisNexis. In the cases in which the city or town is not present in the newspaper description, we use the city or town where the newspaper is headquartered. Figure 1 shows the number of articles about identity theft and data breaches that our news index captures aggregated to the state level in each quarter. 27 During the quarter of the breach, news outlets in South Carolina dramatically increased their coverage on the subject of identity theft by approximately 750 percent compared with the coverage leading up to the incident. A smaller increase can be observed in North Carolina and Georgia during the same quarter. Figure 1 also shows that local press in all three states covered the topic of fraud at approximately the same level in the years leading up to the breach.
Geographic and Temporal Effects of the Breach
Using geographic information from the CCP, we aggregated fraud protections at the state and census tract levels to examine temporal and geospatial trends surrounding the SCDOR data breach in Q4:2012. Similarly, the number of credit freezes filed in South Carolina at the time of the breach increased by about 1,700 percent, the number of initial alerts increased about 540 percent, and the number of opt-outs increased about 233 percent. The increased number of protections filed by South Carolinians persisted for about two quarters before returning to pre-data breach levels, with the exception of credit watches, which continued to be filed at elevated rates through Q2:2013. This is likely to have occurred because the SCDOR pushed back the deadline to enroll in free credit watches to March 31, 2013.
No such obvious trend can be observed in Georgia or North Carolina, although it is notable that, prior to the data breach, both states had more protections filed per quarter compared with South Carolina (which can be explained by the larger populations in North Carolina and Georgia). Before the breach, all three states had similar trends in fraud protection filings. There was a small increase present in the number of initial alerts filed in both Georgia and North
Carolina coinciding with the timing of the SCDOR data breach that could have been a response to news coverage of the event. However, this increase seems to be in line with long-term trends in these states. There was also a curious increase in the number of credit offer opt-outs filed in all three states in the quarter preceding the data breach.
Omitted from Figure 2 is the trend of extended alerts over time. This trend is presented in Panel A of Figure 3 . Extended alerts require sufficient evidence of fraud that would enable a consumer to submit a police report. Thus, this protection service is associated with instances of severe identity theft in which financial damage is visible on the credit bureau record leading up to the time that the alert is filed (Cheney et al., 2014) . In the case study examined here, there is no change in the time trend of extended alerts for any state at the time of the SCDOR data breach.
In Panels B-D of Figure 3 , the average time trends for three variables known to be associated with fraudulent credit activity are presented for our states of interest. Average risk scores, average number of credit inquiries, and the percentage of address changes do not significantly change in South Carolina after the data breach. 28 The nonresponse of extended alerts, risk score, credit inquiries, and address changes suggests that data stolen in the SCDOR 28 Risk score is a proprietary credit score derived by Equifax that is a measure of consumer credit risk based on information contained in Equifax's credit bureau files. It is similar to other credit scores available in the marketplace.
data breach were not used to perpetrate much serious fraud in the quarters immediately following the breach.
Nevertheless, we find much evidence of consumer reaction to the SCDOR data breach in the temporal-geospatial dimension. These astounding rates of credit watch filings directly follow from the free availability of and encouragement to file credit watches provided by the SCDOR to individuals affected by the data breach. A similar argument could be made for initial alerts, credit freezes, and opt-outs as well, since the SCDOR actively reached out to consumers to inform them of the available options to protect their identities from potential harm. However, the explicit encouragement to use credit watches and other types of alerts after the data breach does not mitigate our ability to assess the impact of news on consumer behavior. Consumers still must choose to begin the fraud protection filing process after they receive information on the available options.
Data Breach and Fraud Protection
We estimate an individual's probability of adopting a certain fraud protection service as a function of individual characteristics, the data breach, and risk factors. We focus on the adoption decision because maintenance of fraud protections is mostly mechanical and automatic. 30 Our main specification is as follows:
We use a dynamic logit model to estimate equation (1) This dynamic logit specification is equivalent to discrete duration models as pointed out by Gross and Souleles (2002) and argued in Shumway (2001) . Similar to Gross and Souleles (2002) and Elul et al. (2010) , we attempt to capture the baseline hazard function using a fifthorder polynomial in age. As our unit of analysis is an individual -not a credit card account or mortgage -we use the individual's age in years. We also include quarter fixed effects (time) and state fixed (state) effects into the model (with indexes t and s, respectively). Moreover, we 30 For instance, credit freezes remain active until the consumer takes some action to cancel them. Credit watches, however, which were provided for 12 months and then for another year with a different vendor, require decisionmaking by the consumer for both the initial sign-up and the renewal. An initial fraud alert, which expires within 90 days, is the only mechanism that requires action on the consumer's part every quarter to maintain protection.
control for a set of risk factors recorded in credit bureau files. These factors include risk score, an indicator for the presence of a mortgage, number of credit inquiries within three months and 12 months, age of the newest account, difference in the number of accounts, overall credit card utilization rate (total revolving balance divided by total credit limit), number of 120 days past due occurrences, and change of address. We specify risk score and card utilization rate nonparametrically by including two sets of dummy variables for them. Risk score is divided into Table 2 summarizes these control variables.
Because some credit file characteristics, such as credit inquiries and age of the newest account, may be affected by contemporaneous identity theft and fraud (e.g., criminals opening new fraudulent accounts in a victim's name), we use lags of certain control variables. We select four quarter lags to ensure our control variables are not affected by fraudulent activity. 31 Lagged control variables include credit card utilization, number of inquiries, an indicator for the presence of a mortgage, mobility, age of newest account, and number of 120 days past due occurrences.
Finally, we cluster standard errors at the individual level.
The major variables of interest to us in equation (1) controlling for other factors described previously. The implicit assumption in the events study identification strategy used later is that, in the absence of the breach, trends in the adoption of fraud protection services would be the same in our control group (residents of North Carolina and Georgia) and treatment group (residents of South Carolina). We check the validity of this assumption by looking at the two groups before the breach. We can also see the effect of the breach on fraud protections directly at the time of the event. One noticeable result seen in all the panels of Figure 8 is that the take-up of all four fraud protections jumped at the time of the breach and remained elevated in the quarter following it.
The take-up returned to normal levels in the following quarters. The only service with an elevated level of adoption two quarters after the breach is credit watch. These results are consistent with those seen in earlier figures (Figures 2, 4-7) , showing a strong, even if shortlived, response of consumers to the SCDOR data breach. Figure 8 , however, provides additional evidence as it presents the difference in consumer reaction in the affected area (South Carolina) relative to the control areas (North Carolina and Georgia) and after controlling for credit file characteristics of consumers. The lack of any difference in fraud protection acquisition between the population of South Carolina and the consumers in North Carolina and Georgia before the data breach (time −10 to −1) suggests that residents of North Carolina and Georgia should be an appropriate control group for South Carolina residents affected by the breach in Q4:2012.
Figure 8 also reveals that consumers used available protections to a varying degree. The odds of a credit watch adoption (Panel C) increased 55 times at the time of the data breach, whereas initial alerts and opt-outs were six and three times more likely to be acquired, respectively. Credit freezes were in between these two extremes, with an odds ratio of 29. This divergent take-up of fraud protections might be explained by the emphasis placed on credit watches in the SCDOR communications and remedy actions (i.e., offering and advertising complimentary ProtectMyID credit watch to all victims). The other protection services, however, were only mentioned in some communications (information pamphlets) and not promoted widely. Hence, the relatively strong consumer response in terms of credit freezes is somewhat surprising.
Television Media Markets and Fraud Protection Adoption
The Dissemination of News Through Media Markets
In this section, we attempt to disentangle the different channels through which consumers receive information about data breaches and identity theft and how consumers perceive and react to this information. Several recent studies emphasized the importance of news media coverage on the formation of public opinion, sentiments, and beliefs about risks. Soo (2013) argues that news sentiment about the housing market affects house prices, trading volume, and expectations. Azzimonti (2014) finds that a news index measuring partisan conflict and political polarization may be linked to uncertainty and decreases in investment, output, and employment. Kosse (2013) suggests that news on debit card fraud may discourage card holders from using this payment option. Finally, Kahneman (2011) explains how media coverage may create very powerful images of trivial events, reinforce these images, and generate a very high level of public concern (an availability cascade).
To test this channel of influence, we use data on Nielsen's DMAs. The Nielsen Company (hereafter, Nielsen) conducts research on the shares of viewers of particular television stations in U.S. counties. These counties are organized into DMAs or, simply, media markets, based on viewers' preferences for television channels and programs. Thus, residents of a particular media market are likely to view similar programs, including news on the data breach. However, viewers of a different market may see other local news on a different topic, such as identity theft.
Importantly for us, the boundaries of media markets and states do not coincide, with some DMAs being completely inside a state and others stretching across state borders. Therefore, we are able to separate the effect of the news about the data breach (residing in the affected television media market) from the effect of the exposure to the data breach (residing in South Carolina).
We group counties within seven DMAs created by Nielsen for South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia into three categories based on their location and whether their DMA reaches across state borders: 1) NC/GA Shared -counties inside of North Carolina and Georgia that share a DMA with counties inside of South Carolina; 2) SC Shared -counties inside of South Carolina that share a DMA with counties inside of North Carolina and Georgia; 3) SC Unshared -counties in South Carolina that do not share a DMA with any bordering state.
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Figure 9 plots our defined groups of counties in South Carolina, Georgia, and North Carolina. In the subsequent analysis, we compare these three groups with the control group, which consists of residents of North Carolina and Georgia not sharing media markets with South Carolina.
Our identification strategy is based on the idea of differences in the exposure to the data breach or news about it among these three groups. It can be argued that residents of inner and outer South Carolina media markets are both equally likely to be exposed to the data breach.
However, residents of South Carolina sharing media markets with North Carolina or Georgia, which were unaffected by the breach, may receive less news about the data breach than residents of inner South Carolina media markets. This proposition is based on the variation in local news programming and the argument that residents of the shared media regions receive news pertinent to South Carolina and North Carolina or Georgia. Hence, the news about the breach for South Carolina residents in the shared media regions might be diluted by reporting on events more relevant to residents of Georgia and North Carolina. Thus, if some response to the breach was driven by news coverage, we would expect a stronger reaction among residents of inner South Carolina media markets compared with residents of South Carolina media markets shared with the other states. 32 The DMAs in South Carolina that do not cross borders are Columbia and Charleston. The DMAs that cross borders are Savanah, Augusta-Aiken, Greenville-Spartanburg-Asheville-Anderson, Charlotte, and Myrtle BeachFlorence. 
The Effect of News on Breach Victims
The Effect of News About the Breach on Neighbors
In addition to comparing the reactions to data breaches of consumers inside South Carolina who experienced varying degrees of news coverage, we are able to compare individuals who live inside and outside of South Carolina but share the same media markets. This group of individuals received the same amount of information about the data breach and identity theft, but only South Carolina residents had their personal information stolen during the incident. Thus, we can examine whether receiving news about the data breach is sufficient to induce consumers to adopt fraud protection or if the combination of both news and the threat of stolen information is necessary. However, consumers who received the same amount of news about the breach but lived across the border in North Carolina or Georgia and, therefore, were not directly affected by the incident, did not increase fraud protection take-up. This finding suggests that receiving information about the South Carolina data breach was not sufficient in itself to lead unaffected consumers to update their beliefs about future data breaches and to act on these beliefs by acquiring fraud protections. 
Consumer Reaction to Newspaper Articles on Data Breaches and Identity Theft
In this section, we examine whether newspaper articles about data breaches, identity theft, and fraud influenced consumers who were or were not directly affected by the South Carolina data breach. To explore this question, we use data on the number of newspaper articles from LexisNexis as described in section 3.2. We modify our main specification in the following way: 33 We also include, but do not report, quarter indicators interacted with inner South Carolina media markets. 34 It is possible that in other breaches, with less clarity about who was exposed or less clear and publicized notifications, news accounts may have different effects on consumers. 
where articles is the count of newspaper articles at the city or town (index c) and quarterly level (index t), time and state are sets of quarterly and state fixed effects (indexes t and s, respectively), and ( ) is an indicator variable for living in South Carolina. 35 The variables of major interest to us are the interaction of the time of the breach dummies (Q4 :2012-Q2:2013) with the article count and the living in South Carolina indicator. This specification also includes all the other interactions of these variables (South Carolina and other states, time, and article count). Table 3 reports results from dynamic logit regressions for the take-up of the five fraud protection services. As can be seen in this table, newspaper articles on fraud and identity theft increase the odds of a consumer acquiring one of the protections. The coefficients in Table 3 imply that an extra article increases the odds of a consumer filing an initial alert by about 1.9 percent. The implied coefficients for the other protection services are similar in magnitude. The effects of being in South Carolina at the time of the breach are much larger in magnitude and imply that data breach victims are about 170 percent more likely to file an initial alert immediately after the breach was announced and 320 percent more likely one quarter after that.
These consumers are also more likely to file credit freezes (1,700 percent), credit watches (7,100 35 The median number of articles per city in our sample is five. We included only the first-order term of the article variable in equation (2) On the other hand, local newspaper articles seem to have a small, but statistically significant effect on fraud protection take-up independent of the data breach. This is consistent with prior work showing that consumers alter their behavior after receiving news on debit card fraud but only for brief periods of time (Kosse, 2013) .
Conclusion
This paper uses a natural experiment generated by the 2012 SCDOR data breach to study the response of individual consumers to information security events that expose them to potential fraud. We are able to identify likely victims of the breach and link them to a unique database of fraud protection services. The five fraud protection services we use in this study are initial fraud alert, extended fraud alert, credit (security) freeze, credit watch, and credit and insurance solicitation opt-out. Using these data, we examine how the take-up of fraud protection services responds to direct exposure from the data breach, television coverage of the incident, and local newspaper articles about the issue. We use differences in the take-up of fraud protections among the populations affected through these channels to test several hypotheses about consumers' data security perceptions and interactions with the media.
We find that, within two quarters of the data breach event, consumers directly exposed responded by acquiring fraud protections available to them, excluding the extended fraud alert.
This tendency is consistent with these individuals being unprotected against fraud and identity theft before the incident and protecting against further fallout from the breach. The very high rate of take-up of protections among this population may be because highly salient notifications were sent by the South Carolina government on the state's letterhead. Data breaches with less formal notifications or with less clarity about the affected population may elicit a different response from consumers.
We also find that individuals not directly affected by the breach, but who share the same television markets, and thus are subject to the same amount of media coverage of the breach, did not respond to this breach by acquiring fraud protections. This suggests that consumers in shared television media markets did not substantially update their beliefs about future and unrelated data breaches as a result of the televised news.
We also construct an identity theft news index to examine how local media attention to the issue of data breaches and identity theft may affect individuals and whether it may increase the effect of cybersecurity accidents. Our results suggest that news on identity theft and personal information security prompted some consumers to increase their protections independent of the breach, though the independent effect of the news was small. This is consistent with consumers updating their beliefs about the likelihood of fraud and identity theft based on information contained in the news but also based on their beliefs as to whether they were exposed to a particular breach. On the other hand, we do not find any significant additional effects of media coverage on fraud protections at the time of the South Carolina breach. This finding may imply that media coverage did not amplify the effect of the breach in this particular episode.
Figure 1. Number of Newspaper Articles on Fraud in South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia
Note: This figure shows aggregated local data breach news coverage in the states of interest over time.
Source: Authors' calculations using a news index derived from the Nexis news database Notes: These figures show the odds ratios for the likelihood of filing a specific type of protection for consumers in South Carolina compared with consumers in North Carolina and Georgia. These odds ratios come from dynamic logistic regressions with control variables as described in the text and Table 2 . Dots represent estimated odds ratios bound by 95 percent confidence bands. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. South Carolina consumers were more likely to file for any type of fraud protection in the quarter of the breach and immediately afterward. The effect was largest for credit watches, with South Carolinians being almost 60 times more likely to file during the breach compared with North Carolinians and Georgians. The credit watch filings showed a statistically significant increase for two quarters after the breach. Notes: This map shows counties within seven DMAs created by Nielsen for South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia. We group these counties into three categories based on their location and whether their DMA reaches across state borders: 1) NC/GA Shared -counties inside of North Carolina and Georgia that share a DMA with counties inside of South Carolina; 2) SC Shared -counties inside of South Carolina that share a DMA with counties inside of North Carolina and Georgia; 3) SC Unshared -counties in South Carolina that do not share a DMA with any bordering state.
Source: Authors' calculations using data from Nielsen Notes: These figures show the odds ratios for the likelihood of filing a specific type of fraud protection for consumers in South Carolina counties that shared media markets with counties in other states and those that do not. These odds ratios come from dynamic logistic regressions with control variables as described in the text and Notes: This table presents odds ratios for the likelihood of filing a specific type of protection for independent variables in our dynamic logistic model. These odds ratios come from dynamic logistic regressions with control variables as described in the text and Table 2 . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *** denotes significance at 1 %, ** -at 5 %, and * -at 10 %. Consumers in South Carolina were statistically significantly more likely to file all types of fraud protection during the time of the breach and immediately afterward compared with consumers in other states. News has a small effect on all consumers' filing rates, but does not appear to enhance the response for South Carolina consumers at the time of the breach. 
